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JONES V. DAVIS AND THE CRITICAL ISSUE
OF TIME IN CALIFORNIA’S CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT SYSTEM
HEATHER VARANINI*
“[L]ife in prison with the remote possibility of death.”1
INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment is a long-standing, controversial topic in
America. The controversy lies in competing notions of justice; should
retribution, vengeance, rehabilitation, or some other ideal govern how we
treat those convicted of the worst crimes? This tension is exemplified in
my own experiences. The legal proceedings surrounding the 1993 kid-
napping and murder of 12-year-old Polly Klaas, a friend-of-a-friend in a
neighboring small town, shaped my understanding of crime and punish-
ment.2 However, my understanding was permanently transformed after
hearing Sister Helen Prejean, a leading anti-death penalty activist, ex-
* Executive Ninth Circuit Survey Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review, Volume 47;
J.D. Candidate, Golden Gate University School of Law, May 2017; B.A. Politics/Latin American
and Latino Studies, University of California, Santa Cruz, March 2006. I want to extend my sincerest
gratitude to Professor Eric Christiansen for his patience and invaluable insight as he guided this Note
from inception to publication. Additionally, I want to thank my family and friends for their support
throughout the process of writing this piece. I also want to thank the 2015-2016 Executive Board for
believing in my Note and selecting it for publication; and I want to thank the 2016-2017 Law Review
staff for their time and contributions, which made this Note better. I dedicate this Note to my
husband, who continues to inspire me and encourage me to write.
1 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v.
Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
2 In 1993, twelve-year-old Polly Klaas was kidnapped from her Petaluma, California home
while hosting a slumber party for friends and while her mother slept down the hall. Several months
later, Polly’s body was found outside a small town approximately sixty miles north of Petaluma.
Twenty-three years have passed since Polly was killed, and twenty years have passed since her killer
was sentenced to death. As of this writing, he continues to sit on death row in San Quentin State
Prison awaiting execution, while Polly’s father continues to wait for justice. See People v. Davis,
208 P.3d 78, 78-106 (Cal. 2009) (detailing the facts and proceedings of the case from the guilt phase
63
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plain the complexities of capital punishment.3 My previous experiences
motivate my contemporary interest in California’s capital punishment
system. While the facts differ, the same fraught emotions and legal un-
certainty are reflected in the case examined in this Note. Jones v. Davis4
concerns related tensions in modern death penalty law and practice.
The current landscape of capital punishment in California illumi-
nates the controversy. California is home to almost 25% of all death row
inmates in America5 and the State has spent approximately $4 billion on
capital punishment since 1978.6 However, there have been no executions
in California since 2006.7 This illustrates some of the dysfunction in the
system and the need for change.
Arguments about the death penalty in California have reached yet
another critical point and are currently focused on the lengthy delays that
plague the State’s capital punishment system. Death row inmates as well
as victims’ families and friends agree that the delays cause serious dys-
function in the system. As a result, justice is delayed for those affected
by a sentence of death imposed in California.
Jones v. Davis exemplifies the issue of excessive delays.8 Nearly 25
years have passed between the time Ernest Dewayne Jones committed
the crime and today, but he continues to await execution in San Quentin.
Jones was convicted and sentenced to death in 1995 for the rape and
murder of Julia Miller. On the day Jones was sentenced, the victim’s
daughter declared that she wanted Jones to receive the death penalty.9
through the penalty phase). See also Polly’s Story, POLLY KLAAS FOUND., http://www.pollyklaas
.org/about/pollys-story.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
3 See SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, http://www.sisterhelen.org/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). See
also SISTER HELEN PREJEAN, DEAD MAN WALKING: AN EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT OF THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY IN THE UNITED STATES (Vintage Books ed., 1994). The book details Sister Helen’s experience
as a spiritual adviser to a man sitting on death row in Louisiana. She gained notoriety for the book as
it was an international best seller and was on the New York Times Best Seller list for 31 weeks.
4 In the case of Jones v. Davis, which is the focus of this Note, Ernest Dewayne Jones cur-
rently sits on death row for the rape and murder of Julia Miller in a case previously known as People
v. Jones. However, because Jones’ post-conviction review process has been ongoing since 1995,
some case names have changed. When Jones filed his claim in federal district court against Kevin
Chappell, the previous warden of San Quentin, the name of that case was Jones v. Chappell. When
the current Warden of San Quentin, Ron Davis, filed an appeal before the Ninth Circuit, the case
name changed to Jones v. Davis.
5 Phillip Reese, How California Death Row Inmates Die, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept.
21, 2015, 2:40 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/site-services/databases/article35995422.html.
6 Judge Arthur L. Alarco´n & Paula M. Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A
Roadmap to End or Mend the California Legislature’s Multi-Billion-Dollar Death Penalty Debacle,
44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 41 (2011).
7 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., Number of Executions, 1893 to Present, http://www
.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/Number_Executions.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
8 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
9 Paul Feldman, Murderer is Sentenced to Death, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8, 1995), http://arti-
cles.latimes.com/1995-04-08/local/me-52200_1_death-sentence.
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She also said that since executions were rarely carried out at San Quen-
tin, sentencing Jones to death was a hollow act.10
It was 15 years later when Jones made a parallel argument before a
federal district court in California, and another year later when he made
the argument before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Jones argued
that the delays in California’s capital punishment system were so exces-
sive it was “gravely uncertain” whether he would ever be executed.11
Thus, the excessive delays resulted in arbitrary implementation of the
death penalty, a violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.12 When the Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments on August
31, 2015, after the Warden of San Quentin filed an appeal to challenge
the federal district court’s order, it was nearly 23 years to the day from
when Julia Miller was killed.13
In Jones, the Ninth Circuit reversed the federal district court deci-
sion that vacated Jones’ death sentence and declared California’s capital
punishment system unconstitutional.14 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit
paved the way for executions to resume in California even though a pris-
oner has not been executed in the State for a decade.15
This raises several significant concerns. What are the legal conse-
quences of citizens seriously questioning the use and purpose of the
death penalty? If the courts do not provide answers, where do Californi-
ans look for relief? What is the significance of the death penalty in a state
with a de facto moratorium on executions? And how should judges re-
spond to these changing dynamics?
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit should have affirmed the
district court’s holding, thus invalidating California’s capital punishment
system for three main reasons. First, citizens are losing confidence in the
death penalty, which undermines its deterrent effect. Second, capital pun-
ishment is a critical issue for the State, and Californians and death row
inmates alike must look to the judiciary for relief. Third, the Ninth Cir-
cuit avoided the constitutional issue of California’s capital punishment
10 Id.
11 First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Prisoner in State Custody at 414,
Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 09-02158-CJC), rev’d sub nom. Jones
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
13 People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762, 768 (Cal. 2003) (providing that Julia Miller was killed on
August 24, 1992).
14 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 553 (9th Cir. 2015).
15 Number of Executions, 1893 to Present, supra note 7.
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system by relying on Teague v. Lane.16 In doing so, the court deepened
the problems the Defendant and the district court sought to alleviate.
I. THE FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND OF JONES V.
DAVIS17
Part A provides a detailed description of the facts that resulted in
Jones’ death sentence. Part B discusses Jones’ trial court conviction, sen-
tencing, and automatic appeal.18 Then Part C examines Jones’ petition
for writ of habeas corpus19 and the federal district court’s order.20 Next,
the Warden’s appeal to the Ninth Circuit challenging Judge Carney’s or-
der is reviewed in Part D. Lastly, Part E examines Jones’ argument that
the systematic failure in the capital punishment system yields unconstitu-
tional delays.21
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND: THE REASON FOR JONES’ DEATH
SENTENCE
Ernest Dwayne Jones was accused of sexually assaulting his long-
time friend Kim in May of 1984.22 According to court records, Jones and
Kim used illegal drugs together at her house one day, but when she asked
Jones to leave he assaulted her, threatened to kill her, and raped her at
knifepoint.23 However, Kim dropped the charges after testifying against
Jones at a preliminary hearing because she thought he needed a second
chance.24
In March of 1985, Jones committed rape, sodomy, assault with a
deadly weapon, residential robbery, and first-degree burglary against his
ex-girlfriend’s mother.25 After the assault, Jones asked the mother to kill
16 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that federal courts are prohibited from rec-
ognizing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure on collateral review such as habeas corpus
petitions unless an exception applies).
17 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
18 People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762 (Cal. 2003); Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D.
Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
19 First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Prisoner in State Custody, Jones v.
Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th
Cir. 2015).
20 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v. Davis,
806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
21 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
22 People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762, 771 (Cal. 2003).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 769.
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him with a kitchen knife, but she refused.26 Jones then took cash from
her and tied her up.27 He was convicted for the assaults and sentenced to
12 years in prison.28 In 1991, he was released and placed on parole after
serving five years of his 12-year prison sentence, only ten months before
he committed the murder that put him on California’s death row.29
During August of 1992, Jones lived with a woman named Pam
Miller in Los Angeles.30 Their apartment was close to Pam’s parents’
house.31 On August 24, 1992 around 6:00 p.m., Pam was on the phone
with her mother, Mrs. Julia Miller, when Jones interrupted to ask Pam if
her parents were home.32 Pam said her mother was at home and her fa-
ther was at work.33
Jones left the apartment around 7:40 p.m., and bought cocaine and
marijuana for the second time that day.34 Jones’ drug dealer was a friend
of Pam’s and lived near the Millers.35 During this outing, Jones used a
gold chain to pay for drugs.36 He returned to the apartment at 9:30 p.m.,
indulged in drug use, switched the phone’s ringer off, then left at 10:00
p.m.37 Jones returned to the drug dealer’s house and bought more drugs,
paying with several pieces of pearl jewelry.38 At 10:20 p.m., Jones re-
turned to the apartment and engaged in more drug use.39 Pam awoke
around midnight to find Jones in different clothes.40
Pam’s father, Mr. Chester Miller, arrived home from work not long
after midnight on August 25, 1992.41 Mr. Miller discovered his wife dead
at the end of their bed: naked, sexually assaulted, bound, gagged, and
stabbed.42 Pieces of three kitchen knives were found around her body,
two other knives were coming out of her neck, a rag was wrapped around
















41 Id. at 767.
42 Id. at 768.
43 Id.
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were bound by a loosely tied nightgown, and her arms were tied above
her head by the strap from a purse and by the cord from a telephone.44
Criminalists from the Los Angeles County Coroner’s Office investi-
gated the sexual assault.45 DNA samples taken from Mrs. Miller’s body
and Jones’ blood were compared against each other, and the test showed
there was a match between the samples.46 The Los Angeles County Cor-
oner’s deputy medical examiner performed the autopsy on Mrs. Miller
and determined she was killed by the stab wound to the middle of her
chest.47
After learning that her mother had been killed, Pam went to her
grandparents’ house and shared the news with a friend.48 Pam’s friend
said that Jones purchased drugs from her several times earlier that day
and described the jewelry Jones used as payment.49 Pam recognized the
jewelry as her mother’s, took it to the detectives, and told them to go to
her apartment because she knew who had killed her mother.50
Police officers found the Miller’s car near Jones’ apartment and
watched Jones as he got in and drove away.51 A police chase ensued until
the tires blew out on Jones’ car.52 Jones shot himself in the chest when
officers told him to get out of the vehicle.53 He was charged with bur-
glary, robbery, rape, and murder.54
B. JONES’ TRIAL COURT CONVICTION AND AUTOMATIC APPEAL
In 1995, Jones was convicted of the rape and first-degree murder of
Mrs. Miller.55 Jones was found not guilty of burglary or robbery.56 The
44 Id.
45 Id. at 769.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 768-69.






54 Paul Feldman, The Mundane Murder Trial Down the Hall, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 6, 1995),
http://articles.latimes.com/1995-04-06/news/mn-51562_1_murder-trials. Just three doors down the
hall from Jones’ trial at the Los Angeles County Superior Courthouse, another murder trial was
proceeding. It was the “trial of the century:” People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct.
L.A. Cty. 1994) (Professional athlete and actor, O.J. Simpson was tried for murder; O.J.’s ex-wife
and her friend were stabbed to death on June 12, 1994 in Los Angeles). Although there were some
similarities between the two cases, they could not have been more different. For example, there were
only two articles written about the Jones trial compared to the international media coverage the
Simpson case received.
55 People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762, 767 (Cal. 2003).
56 Id.
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jury found the special circumstance57 that the murder was committed in
the commission of the rape, that Jones had served a prior prison term,
and that he used a deadly weapon—a knife—to commit the crimes.58
Jones was subsequently sentenced to death.59
In every case where the trier of fact imposes the death penalty in
California, the defendant is treated as though they filed a motion to over-
turn or modify the jury’s verdict.60 The judge then reviews all the evi-
dence while taking into account the aggregating and mitigating
circumstances under the law,61 and evaluates the jury’s decision.62 The
judge can deny the motions, order a new trial, or reduce the sentence.63
The trial court denied Jones’ motions for modification of the sentence
and for a new trial.64
The appeal to the California Supreme Court was automatic.65 When
a capital sentence is imposed in California and the trial judge denies mo-
tions for a new trial or for a reduction of sentence, the sentence is auto-
matically appealed to the California Supreme Court.66 The California
Supreme Court fully affirmed the trial court’s judgment in 2003, 11 years
after the crime.67
C. JONES’ PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND JUDGE
CARNEY’S ORDER
In 2010, Jones filed an appeal to the United States District Court in
the Central District of California in a 454-page amended petition for writ
57 In death penalty cases, special circumstances are aggravating factors in connection with
first-degree murder. Under California Penal Code § 190.2, there are approximately 22 special cir-
cumstances. In current California laws related to capital punishment, “87% of California’s first de-
gree murders are ‘death eligible,’ and could be prosecuted as death cases.” CAL. COMM’N ON THE
FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 120 (2008), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcon
tent.cgi?article=1000&context=ncippubs.
58 People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762, 767 (Cal. 2003).
59 Id. Under California Penal Code § 190.4(a)-(d), Criminal cases in California that warrant a
death sentence are split into two phases: the guilt phase and the sentencing phase. During the guilt
phase, the jury must decide whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first-degree
murder with at least one special circumstance. If the jury finds the defendant guilty, the trial moves
to the penalty phase. During the penalty phase, the jury reviews evidence and must return a verdict
of either life in prison without the possibility of parole or death. See also OFFICE OF VICTIMS’
SERVS.: CAL. ATT’Y GEN. OFFICE, A VICTIM’S GUIDE TO THE CAPITAL CASE PROCESS 1, http://oag.ca
.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/publications/deathpen.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
60 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(e) (2016).
61 PENAL CODE § 190.3.
62 PENAL CODE § 190.4(e).
63 PENAL CODE §§ 190.4(e), 1181.
64 People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762, 767 (Cal. 2003).
65 Id.
66 PENAL CODE § 1239(b).
67 People v. Jones, 64 P.3d 762, 767 (Cal. 2003).
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of habeas corpus.68 In Jones’ 27th claim for relief, he argued that his
death sentence was unconstitutional because the delays in the system
“render[ed] it gravely uncertain when or whether [the] execution will
ever be conducted.”69 Four years later, the federal district court issued an
order stating that California’s post-conviction review process was uncon-
stitutional and instructed Jones to file an amended petition to claim 27
(hereinafter Jones’ “unconstitutional delay claim”70) addressing the sys-
tem-wide delays.71 Jones filed an amended claim and the parties filed
supplemental briefs addressing the delays.72
Writing for the district court, Judge Carney issued an order “declar-
ing California’s death penalty system unconstitutional and vacating
[Jones’] death sentence.”73 The court held California’s death penalty was
unconstitutional because the “inordinate and unpredictable delay” in ex-
ecutions caused by the system amounted to arbitrary implementation.74
The order detailed the legal history of capital punishment in California
and identified the root of the delays in the system, which the court identi-
fied as the system itself.75 Judge Carney found that the delays occur at
every stage of the post-conviction review process starting from the time
the death penalty is imposed.76
Statistics bolstered the opinion, showing that despite having more
inmates sentenced to death than any other state in the country, most in-
mates will die of causes other than execution.77 The court also relied on
the report written by the bipartisan and career-diverse California Com-
mission on the Fair Administration of Justice (hereinafter the Commis-
sion).78 The Commission was established by the California legislature
and was responsible for reviewing the state’s justice system in-depth.79
68 First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Prisoner in State Custody, Jones v.
Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th
Cir. 2015).
69 Id. at 414.
70 When a death row inmate claims that their incarceration is so long that it amounts to cruel
and unusual punishment, and thus a constitutional violation, the claim is referred to as a Lackey
claim. Lackey v. Texas, 520 U.S. 1183 (1995); see also Johnson v. Bredesen 558 U.S. 1067 (2009)
(mem.). Here, Jones does not assert a Lackey claim because he is not asserting a constitutional
violation related to the length of his imprisonment, but the length of delays within the post-convic-
tion review process.
71 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 542 (9th Cir. 2015).
72 Id.
73 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1052 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v.
Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
74 Id. at 1069.
75 Id. at 1053-60.
76 Id. at 1054-60.
77 Id. at 1053-54.
78 Id. at 1055.
79 Id.
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As part of its review, the Commission analyzed the State’s administra-
tion of the death penalty.80 The Commission concluded that “California’s
death penalty system is dysfunctional. The system is plagued with exces-
sive delay . . . .”81
According to Judge Carney, death sentences in California have been
transformed into “life in prison, with the remote possibility of death.”82
Furthermore, for the “random few for whom execution does become a
reality, they will have languished for so long on Death Row that their
execution will serve no retributive or deterrent purpose and will be arbi-
trary.”83 In other words, a capital sentence in California is a violation of
the Eighth Amendment84 because of excessive delays. The delays in the
post-conviction review process permeate the system to the extent that the
ultimate punishment no longer serves its original purpose and results in
random implementation of the executions.
D. THE WARDEN OF SAN QUENTIN OBJECTS TO JUDGE CARNEY’S
ORDER
The California Attorney General, on behalf of the Warden of San
Quentin, submitted an opening brief to the Ninth Circuit on December 1,
2014,85 and filed a reply brief on April 13, 2015.86 The Warden argued
that the order vacating Jones’ death sentence and declaring the State’s
capital punishment system unconstitutional should be reversed.87 Fur-
ther, the Warden argued that Judge Carney’s order was improper for sev-
eral reasons88 and characterized it as “fundamentally misguided.”89
While the Warden recognized the serious interests at stake in death pen-
alty cases, he argued that California’s system is designed to create more
protection because of the weight of the interests involved.90 Further, Cal-
ifornia’s capital punishment system operates to ensure no arbitrary im-
80 Id.
81 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 111.
82 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v.
Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
83 Id.
84 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments).
85 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 58, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015) (No.
14–56373), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2015/07/23/14-56373%20%20opening%20
brief.pdf.
86 Appellant’s Reply Brief at 31, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015) (No.
14–56373), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2015/07/23/14-56373%20%20reply%20br
ief.pdf.
87 Appellant’s Opening Br. 1-3.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 2.
90 Id. at 2-3.
9
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plementation of the death penalty as it affords capital defendants ample
opportunities and resources to challenge their convictions.91 The Warden
argued that the process takes time because it provides “careful, individu-
alized review.”92 Additionally, the Warden criticized the court for using
a policy argument as its basis for finding California’s capital punishment
system unconstitutional, and argued that there is no legal basis for the
judge’s determination.93
The Warden outlined four main arguments to support his position.
First, the district court had improperly granted relief based on a theory
never presented to any court by Jones.94 He distinguished Jones’ argu-
ment in two ways: by asserting that Jones had alleged an Eighth Amend-
ment violation would result from the continuing litigation process that is
part of California’s dysfunctional system and that Jones had not argued
that it was the system-wide dysfunction that created the arbitrary imple-
mentation of the death penalty.95 Further, the Warden argued that Jones’
claim was prohibited under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 (hereinafter AEDPA)96 because the law prohibits “fed-
eral habeas relief for any claim adjudicated on the merits in state
court.”97 The Warden asserted that Jones’ amended unconstitutional de-
lay claim presented the same Eighth Amendment claim Jones had
brought before the California Supreme Court.98 Since the court rejected
the claim, the Warden argued that the Ninth Circuit, under AEDPA, was
prohibited from providing Jones relief.99
Second, the arbitrariness theory had not been exhausted in state
courts100 as required by AEDPA.101 The Warden insisted that Jones
failed to present his Eighth Amendment claim to the various state courts
as required by the rule.102
Third, the anti-retroactivity doctrine outlined in Teague103 prohib-
ited the district court from providing Jones relief on the theory of arbi-
91 Id. at 2.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 3.
94 Id. at 14.
95 Id. at 14-15.
96 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132 110 Stat. 1214
(1996) (codified in part into 28 U.S.C. § 2245 (2016)).
97 Appellant’s Opening Br. 15.
98 Id. at 19.
99 Id. at 21.
100 Id. at 15.
101 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2016).
102 Appellant’s Opening Br. 25-26.
103 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (holding that federal courts are prohibited from
recognizing new constitutional rules of criminal procedure on collateral review such as habeas
corpus petitions unless an exception applies).
10
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trariness because it was a new rule and did not fall under any exception
outlined by Teague.104 Fourth, Judge Carney’s order was in contraven-
tion of Eighth Amendment precedent, and California’s capital punish-
ment review process is consistent with the Eighth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.105 The Warden substantiated his arguments
about the flawed nature of the district court’s ruling and stated that the
State’s post-conviction review process in death penalty cases is long, but
also crucial to avoid violations related to error and arbitrariness.106
E. JONES ASSERTS SYSTEMATIC FAILURE YIELDS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
DELAYS
In Jones’ Answering Brief,107 he relied on the landmark case from
the United States Supreme Court, Furman v. Georgia,108 to argue that
the system-wide delays present in California’s capital punishment system
result in arbitrary, thus unconstitutional, implementation of the death
penalty within the State.109 According to Jones, the delays are “so ex-
traordinary” the State’s “death penalty has ceased to serve any legitimate
penological purpose.”110 Thus, Jones argued that the Ninth Circuit
should affirm the district court’s judgment.111 Jones likened his case to
Furman by discussing the arbitrariness by which the sentences of death
were implemented and by presenting an abundance of statistical
evidence.112
Jones raised five main arguments in his brief. First, unconstitutional
delays are present at every level of the capital punishment system in Cal-
ifornia.113 Second, Jones was properly granted relief by the district court
because California’s death penalty system results in arbitrary implemen-
tation in violation of the Eighth Amendment.114 Third, the exhaustion
104 Id. at 16-17.
105 Id. at 17-19.
106 Id. at 18.
107 Petitioner-Appellee’s Answering Brief, Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015) (No.
14–56373), http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2015/07/23/14-56373%20answering%20br
ief.pdf.
108 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in certain cases violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment).
109 Pet’r-Appellee’s Answering Br. 1-2.
110 Id. at 11.
111 Id. at 58.
112 Id. at 1-4. For example, the majority of death row inmates will spend more than 30 years
challenging their capital sentence in part because it takes an average of 16 years to appoint habeas
corpus counsel.
113 Id. at 18.
114 Id. at 22, 24, 29.
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rule from AEDPA was not a barrier to relief because: the Warden waived
exhaustion, Jones fell under one of the AEDPA exceptions, and Jones
was unable to exhaust that claim in state court because he does not yet
have an execution date.115 Fourth, 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d) did not ap-
ply to his amended unconstitutional delay claim because it was different
from the claim he raised on direct appeal and was never adjudicated on
the merits by the state court.116 Fifth, the district court correctly held that
his claim was not barred by Teague117 because the Warden waived the
defense,118 the rule was not new, and if the district court did announce a
new rule,119 it was substantive.120
After Jones submitted his brief, the Ninth Circuit reviewed briefs
from both parties and amici.121 The court heard oral arguments on Au-
gust 31, 2015122 and issued the opinion on November 12, 2015.123
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ALLOWS EXECUTIONS TO RESUME IN
CALIFORNIA
The Ninth Circuit reversed the federal district court’s judgment that
granted relief to Jones and declared California’s death penalty unconsti-
tutional,124 effectively paving the way for executions to resume in Cali-
fornia. The court held that it was prohibited from analyzing the
substantive claim challenging the constitutionality of the State’s capital
punishment system because Jones asked the court to apply a novel con-
stitutional rule as barred by Teague v. Lane.125 First, the court analyzed
Teague, then explained its use of discretion to address the Teague in-
quiry rather than the issue of exhaustion.126 Finally, the court discussed
additional reasons for not addressing Jones’ unconstitutional delay claim,
such as Congressional intent regarding AEDPA and concerns of comity.
115 Id. at 32-33, 40, 43.
116 Id. at 48-49.
117 Id. at 49.
118 Id. at 49-51.
119 Id. at 51-53.
120 Id. at 53-54.
121 Jones v. Davis: Constitutionality of California Death Penalty, U.S. COURTS FOR THE
NINTH CIRCUIT (last updated Feb. 23, 2016, 12:17 PM), http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view
.php?pk_id=0000000802 (listing amici who filed timely briefs, including The Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation, California Attorneys for Criminal Justice, Death Penalty Focus, Empirical Scholars,
Murder Victims’ Families, State Senator Loni Hancock, Loyola Law School, Correctional Lieuten-
ant M. Thompson, and the Innocence Project).
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 553 (9th Cir. 2015).
125 Id.
126 Id. at 545-553.
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A. TEAGUE BARS JONES’ CLAIM FOR RELIEF
The Ninth Circuit held that Teague barred Jones’ claim because
Jones sought to apply a new rule and neither of the Teague exceptions
applied.127 The Court in Teague held that habeas corpus could not be
used as an instrument to create new constitutional rules of criminal pro-
cedure except in two instances where the rule would apply
retroactively.128
1. Teague’s Retroactivity Doctrine and its Two Exceptions
The United States Supreme Court used Teague to clarify how retro-
activity should be decided for cases on collateral review,129 and stated
that the issue of retroactivity is a threshold question.130 New constitu-
tional rules of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review unless one of two exceptions applies.131 The Court clar-
ified that habeas corpus is a collateral remedy, and “habeas corpus can-
not be used . . . to create new constitutional rules of criminal procedure
unless those rules would be applied retroactively to all defendants on
collateral review” through either exception.132 The first exception is that
“a new rule should be applied retroactively . . . if it places ‘certain kinds
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal
law-making authority to proscribe.’”133 The second exception is limited
to watershed rules of criminal procedure and new rules should be applied
retroactively if they require adherence to procedures that were “implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.”134
127 Id. at 552.
128 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 306-08, 316 (1989).
129 Id. at 305-08 (quoting Mackey v. U.S., 401 U.S. 667, 682 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Collateral review is “judicial review that occurs in a proceeding outside of the direct review pro-
cess.” Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 560 (2011). See also James Bickford, Opinion Recap: All Judi-
cial Review is Either Direct or Collateral, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 9, 2011, 2:42 PM), http://www
.scotusblog.com/2011/03/opinion-summary-all-judicial-review-is-either-direct-or-collateral.
130 Teague, 489 U.S. at 300.
131 Id. at 316.
132 Id. at 306, 316 (quoting Mackey v. U.S., 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)).
133 Id. at 290 (quoting Mackey v. U.S., 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
134 Id. at 311 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). The Court in Teague
defined watershed rules as “new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction
is seriously diminished.”
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2. The Teague Analysis Applied to Jones
Teague is a requirement to analyze the substance of one aspect of
the claim and not the foundational merits of the claim.135 The Ninth Cir-
cuit evaluated the novelty of Jones’ unconstitutional delay claim because
the Teague inquiry is not wholly procedural: “Teague requires an analy-
sis of the underlying legal theory of the claim—albeit to determine its
novelty rather than its ultimate persuasiveness.”136 Here, Teague barred
Jones’ unconstitutional delay claim because Jones sought to apply a
novel constitutional rule and neither of the two exceptions applied.137
Jones sought to apply a new rule, “[A] state may not arbitrarily in-
flict the death penalty,” created by Jones and the district court.138 Jones
argued that his rule was substantive, and thus an exception to Teague.139
Jones focused on the inherent delay of the system as opposed to the de-
lays he experienced as an individual, which distinguished his unconstitu-
tional delay claim from similar claims regarding delays in the State’s
post-conviction review process.140 However, the court found that the
long delays in the system prior to execution were not violations of the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.141
The court also rejected Jones’ rule for being too broad.”142 Several
United States Supreme Court cases rejected rules in capital punishment
cases it considered “too broad.”143 For example, the Court applied a rule
similar to Jones’ in one specific form of arbitrariness in Furman, a death
penalty case that was meant to be read narrowly.144 Jones’ rule is distin-
guishable from the rule set forth in Furman in two ways. First, Furman
argued arbitrary sentencing while Jones argued arbitrary implementation
of death sentences.145 Second, Jones argued that the appeals process is so
long it creates uncertainty as to whether a prisoner will ever be executed,
and that is arbitrary.146 Jones neither argued that the State gave the fact
finder discretion regarding the execution date, nor did he argue the exe-
135 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 544 (9th Cir. 2015).
136 Id.
137 Id. at 541, 552.
138 Id. at 543 (quoting Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2014)).
139 Id. at 552.
140 Id. at 548-49.
141 Id. at 548 (citing Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946, 958 (9th Cir. 2006)).
142 Id. at 550.
143 Id.; see Gray v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 169 (1996); see also Gilmore v. Taylor, 508
U.S. 333, 344 (1993).
144 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 550 (9th Cir. 2015).
145 Id. at 550-51.
146 Id. at 551.
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cution date was chosen randomly.147 Furman is not so broad as to en-
compass Jones’ rule,148 and “‘there is a simple and logical difference’
between Furman’s rule prohibiting unfettered discretion by a jury decid-
ing whether to impose the death penalty and a rule prohibiting systemic
lengthy delays resulting from a state’s post-sentencing procedures in the
carrying out of that sentence when permissibly imposed.”149 Addition-
ally, Jones’ conviction became final in 2003 after the Court’s rulings in
Furman and Gregg, so neither applies.150 Lastly, Teague’s second ex-
ception did not apply because Jones did not argue that his proffered rule
fell under the watershed exception.151
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECLINES TO ANALYZE THE EXHAUSTION
ISSUE
The Ninth Circuit used its discretion to focus on the Teague inquiry
rather than the exhaustion issue.152 Usually exhaustion is considered first
because an application for a writ of habeas corpus is not granted unless
the petitioner has exhausted all state court remedies or the petitioner has
shown an exception to the exhaustion requirement under 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 2254(b)(1).153 Additionally, under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(b)(2), an
application for writ of habeas corpus can be denied on the merits, regard-
less of exhaustion.154 Further, the Ninth Circuit pointed to Congressional
intent as support for its decision to primarily review the Teague inquiry
and deny the petitioner’s application.155 Congressional intent regarding
denial on the merits included the Teague inquiry as part of the merits
upon which the court could deny a writ of habeas corpus.156
The court further explained its avoidance of the exhaustion issue,
stating that “analyzing the exhaustion issue would serve no useful pur-
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id. (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 490 (1990)).
150 Id. at 548. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that the “impo-
sition and carrying out of the death penalty” is a violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
when it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Although the justices could not agree on the
rationale, this opinion created a de facto moratorium on the death penalty in America.). Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that the statutory death penalty system in Georgia was consti-
tutional. As a result, executions resumed across the country.).
151 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 552 n.6 (9th Cir. 2015).
152 Id. at 543.
153 Id. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) requires petitioners to exhaust state court remedies in order for
a federal court to grant an application for writ of habeas corpus.
154 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 543-44 (9th Cir. 2015).
155 Id. at 544.
156 Id.
15
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pose.”157 The Ninth Circuit was required to analyze Teague regardless of
whether the court analyzed Jones’ claim that he showed an exception to
exhaustion, or whether it analyzed the government’s argument that Jones
fulfilled the exhaustion requirement.158 Dealing with either issue first
would create further delay in Jones’ quest for relief, and effectively fur-
ther his argument.159 The decision to focus on Teague was rooted in
concerns about judicial economy.160
Additionally, Judge Watford issued a concurrence stating that he
would reverse the district court’s judgment on the basis that Jones’ did
not satisfy the exhaustion requirement.161 The judge also characterized
the new rule announced by the federal district court as “substantive
rather than procedural.”162
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S JUSTIFICATIONS FOR NOT ADDRESSING
JONES’ UNCONSTITUTIONAL DELAY CLAIM
Interpretation of Congressional intent and issues of comity also pre-
vented the Ninth Circuit from addressing Jones’ unconstitutional delay
claim. Congressional intent regarding the language in the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 coupled with the requirement
that federal courts “must apply Teague before” reaching substantive
questions,163 meant that the Ninth Circuit did not have to address Jones’
unconstitutional delay claim. Congressional intent was not to construe
section 28 U.S.C. section 2254(b)(2) narrowly so that the court did not
have to look solely to the substantive issue for a denial of the writ: “[sec-
tion] 2254(b)(2) encompasses, at a minimum, the substance-like inquiry
demanded by Teague.”164 The phrase “on the merits” from section
2254(b)(2) was meant to be construed broadly, even though “in the ab-
stract, the phrase ‘on the merits’ has many potential meanings, including
a narrow meaning that requires adjudication of the substantive validity of
the underlying claim itself.”165
The court was also concerned with comity and upsetting the state
court’s judgment.166 Comity speaks to the inherent issue of federalism
157 Id. at 545.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 545-46.
161 Id. at 555 (Watford, J. concurrence). This case was presented before Judges Graber, Rawl-
inson, and Watford. Judge Graber wrote the opinion.
162 Id. at 553 (Watford, J. concurrence).
163 Id. at 545 n.1 (quoting Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994)).
164 Id. at 544.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 546.
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and the system’s attempt at balancing federal and state interests. Since
criminal law and procedure are traditionally state police powers that en-
compass health, welfare, safety, and morals, federal courts like the Ninth
Circuit are hesitant to regulate in those areas. Under the rule of comity,
state courts have the first opportunity at dealing with claims by petition-
ers alleging that their confinement is a violation of federal law.167 Here,
the Ninth Circuit did not want to disturb the state court judgment for
reasons of comity, “conclud[ing] that it is ‘perfectly clear’ that [Jones]
cannot prevail.”168 Additionally, federal courts can only deny relief
under section 2254(b)(2) when it is “perfectly clear that the petitioner has
no hope of prevailing.”169
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT CIRCUMVENTED REVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN
CALIFORNIA
For purposes of this Note, it is helpful to think of the Eighth Amend-
ment’s protection against the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment
from two distinct, but interrelated perspectives: procedural and substan-
tive. The procedural perspective relates to the how: the method of sen-
tencing and execution, as well as the processes for post-conviction
review. The substantive perspective relates to the core legality: in this
context, fundamental questions about the existence and use of capital
punishment, and whether the methods and procedures surrounding capi-
tal punishment are constitutional.
In Jones v. Davis, the Ninth Circuit used the “substance-like”
Teague inquiry170 to avoid the substantive issues at hand: whether the
duration of California’s post-conviction review process in death penalty
cases is so long that the implementation of the penalty is arbitrary, and
thus unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. Sidestepping that is-
sue meant the court also avoided the broader issue of whether Califor-
nia’s capital punishment system should be abolished. While the court
treated Teague as the substantive issue in Jones, it was Jones’ unconsti-
tutional delay claim that was truly the substantive issue.
The Ninth Circuit should have addressed the substantive issue of
whether California’s capital punishment system is constitutional in light
of three challenges presented in this case. First, citizens are losing confi-
167 Id. (quoting O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 525 U.S. 838, 844 (1999)).
168 Id. (quoting Cassett v. Stewart, 406 F.3d 614, 624 (9th Cir. 2005)).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 544 (“[28 U.S.C. §] 2254(b)(2) encompasses, at a minimum, the substance-like
inquiry demanded by Teague.”).
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dence in the capital punishment system’s ability to effectively deter
crime. Second, capital punishment is a uniquely critical issue in Califor-
nia, home to more death row inmates than any other state. Third, by
focusing on the Teague inquiry, the court used Jones’ arguments against
him and suggested a remedy that is deeply problematic to the people
affected by a capital sentence.
A. CITIZENS ARE LOSING CONFIDENCE IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
America is dealing with the death penalty as a nationwide issue and
confidence in capital punishment has been waning.171 Each year since
2011, states have been abolishing and invalidating the death penalty.172
Many states in America are not utilizing executions as the ultimate pun-
ishment as 36 out of 50 states have not executed a person in at least five
years or have repealed the death penalty.173 Although the death penalty
remains legal in 32 states,174 18 of those states did not impose any new
death sentences in 2015.175 In California, more than 900 men and women
have been sentenced to death since 1978,176 but only 13 people have
actually been executed since then.177
171 Death Penalty, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1606/death-penalty.aspx (last visited
Nov. 13, 2016).
172 II: Timeline of State Death Penalty Laws, 1972-Present, PROCON.ORG (last updated Nov.
9, 2016, 1:14 PM), http://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=001172. While
New York and New Jersey invalidated their capital punishment systems in 2007, no states abolished
the death penalty in 2008 or 2010. The following states abolished or imposed a moratorium on the
death penalty in recent years: New Mexico (2009), Illinois (2011), Connecticut (2012), Maryland
(2013), and Nebraska (2015). States With and Without the Death Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-and-without-death-penalty (last updated Nov. 9, 2016).
Florida houses the second largest number of death row inmates in the country as 385 await execu-
tion. Death Row Roster, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/activeinmates/deathrowros
ter.asp (last updated Nov. 13, 2016). Florida’s death penalty has been in flux during 2016: the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the State’s capital punishment process was unconstitutional, then
legislators passed news laws in response which have been challenged and deemed unconstitutional
by Florida’s Supreme Court. Florida Supreme Court Says State’s New Death Penalty Law is Uncon-
stitutional, THE WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-na
tion/wp/2016/10/14/florida-supreme-court-says-states-new-death-penalty-law-is-unconstitutional/?
utm_term=.0441104d0b26.
173 Jurisdictions With No Recent Executions, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www
.deathpenaltyinfo.org/jurisdictions-no-recent-executions (last updated Aug. 18, 2016).
174 32 States With the Death Penalty and 18 States With Death Penalty Bans, PROCON.ORG,
http://deathpenalty.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=001172 (last updated Nov. 9, 2016
1:14 PM).
175 The Death Penalty in 2015: Year End Report, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. 4 (2015), http:/
/deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/2015YrEnd.pdf.
176 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v.
Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
177 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., Inmates Executed, 1978-Present, http://www.cdcr.ca
.gov/Capital_Punishment/Inmates_Executed.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
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According to a 2011 Gallup poll, more than 60% of people feel that
the death penalty does not act as a deterrent or does not lower the murder
rate compared to Americans who were polled in 1985.178 This means the
number of people who feel as though the death penalty does not act as a
deterrent or does not lower the murder rate more than doubled in the
span of almost 30 years. Additionally, almost 60% of people think that
an innocent person has been executed under the death penalty in America
within the last five years.179 The data also shows that overall support for
the death penalty has been declining and opposition has been increas-
ing.180 This is important because people must believe that the system
works and those sentenced to death will be executed within a reasonable
amount of time for capital punishment to have a deterrent effect.181
B. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IS A CRITICAL ISSUE FOR CALIFORNIA
The death penalty is a critical issue economically, socially, and po-
litically to California and its residents. Californians are losing confidence
in the capital punishment system and must find relief through the
judiciary.
California houses almost 25% of America’s death row inmates182
with 750 people currently awaiting execution.183 This means the State is
home to those affected the most: families and friends of the victims
harmed by the inmates, the death row inmates themselves, and their fam-
ilies and friends. Since the reinstatement of the State’s death penalty in
1978, 119 of California’s death row inmates have died—104 of those
deaths have been classified as non-execution deaths (i.e., natural causes,
suicide, or other).184 Moreover, the State has spent approximately $4 bil-
lion on capital punishment since its reinstatement.185





“The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deter-
rence of capital crimes by prospective offenders.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976).
182 Phillip Reese, How California Death Row Inmates Die, THE SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 21,
2015, 2:40 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/site-services/databases/article35995422.html.
183 CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., Condemned Inmate List, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital
_Punishment/docs/CondemnedInmateListSecure.pdf (last updated Nov. 3, 2016).
184 During the writing of this Note, four inmates on California’s death row have died. One
died of natural causes in August of 2015 just days before Jones’ case was heard at the Ninth Circuit,
another was executed in Virginia in October of the same year, and two died of natural causes in
2016. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., Condemned Inmates Who Have Died Since 1978 (Jul. 18,
2016), http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Capital_Punishment/docs/CONDEMNEDINMATESWHO
HAVEDIEDSINCE1978.pdf.
185 Alarco´n & Mitchell, supra note 6.
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Like many Americans, Californians are losing confidence in the
death penalty. A poll conducted in 2012 found that 55% of all adults in
California believed life without the possibility of parole should be the
punishment for first-degree murder, with only 38% believing the punish-
ment should be death.186
Californians have unsuccessfully sought answers from the State leg-
islature despite the loss of confidence in the death penalty. Proposition
34, the SAFE California Act, was on the ballot in 2012.187 Prop 34
would have repealed and abolished the death penalty, replacing it with
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for those convicted of
murder with special circumstances.188 It was defeated by a very narrow
margin with 48% of votes in favor of the proposition and 52% against
it.189 At the time the Ninth Circuit was deciding Jones, two competing
death penalty propositions were slated for California’s November 2016
ballot.190 This made the Ninth Circuit’s decision even more critical be-
cause the State legislature has struggled to produce definitive results.
Californians and victims of crimes committed by death row inmates must
rely on the judiciary for answers. Additionally, those awaiting execution
are confined to using the judicial process for relief, which further under-
scores the need for a fair and predictable judicial process. Judge Carney’s
order holding California’s death penalty unconstitutional provided the
answer the State legislature failed to produce. Yet, the Ninth Circuit re-
versed Judge Carney’s order, ostensibly creating more litigation, more
unnecessary delays, and allowing the system-wide problems outlined by
Judge Carney and Jones to worsen in California.
186 Mark Baldassare et. al, Californians and Their Government, 53 PUB. POLICY INST. OF
CAL. at 21 (Sept. 2012), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/survey/S_912MBS.pdf. This indepen-
dent, nonpartisan study was conducted as part of the PPIC’s ongoing efforts to understand what
influences Californians voting choices and policy preferences.




190 Mayde Gomez, Death Penalty Reform and Saving Act of 2016 Pushes to Speed Up Cali-
fornia Executions, ABC 7 EYEWITNESS NEWS (Oct. 30, 2015), http://abc7.com/news/group-pushes-
to-speed-up-executions-in-california/1060763/. The two competing ballot measures were Proposi-
tions 62 and 66. Proposition 62 sought to repeal the State’s death penalty and replace it with life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole; it would also apply retroactively. Proposition 66
sought to shorten the amount of time in which an inmate may challenge a death sentence while also
significantly changing other procedures related to challenging and carrying out a death sentence.
Both propositions would increase the amount of money deducted from affected inmates for restitu-
tion to victims’ and their families. CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE, OFFICIAL VOTER INFO. GUIDE 78-83, 104-
09 (2016), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2016/general/en/pdf/complete-vig.pdf. Regardless of the out-
come, the arguments related to the constitutionality of California’s death penalty remain. However,
future articles may examine the short and long-term effects of the winning proposition on the State’s
capital punishment system.
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C. THE COURT’S IMPROPER DEFENSE OF THE TEAGUE BAR
By focusing squarely on the Teague inquiry, the Ninth Circuit
avoided the substantive issue of the constitutionality of California’s capi-
tal punishment system raised by Jones. The court supported its decision
to do so primarily based on arguments of judicial economy and protect-
ing the rights of death row inmates. By focusing on judicial economy, the
Ninth Circuit struck at the heart of the petitioner’s argument, using it as a
shield and a sword. Further, the court acted callously in ignoring Jones’
attacks on the inherent delays that plague the post-conviction review pro-
cess by relying on the protection argument.191
The Ninth Circuit firmly and repeatedly defended its decision to fo-
cus on and apply the retroactivity doctrine from Teague.192 The court
also interpreted the Teague inquiry as not wholly procedural, as it evalu-
ated the novelty of the claim: “Teague requires an analysis of the under-
lying legal theory of the claim—albeit to determine its novelty rather
than its ultimate persuasiveness.”193 Instead of discussing and deciding
this case on the issue of whether California’s death penalty post-convic-
tion review process is “so fraught with delay” as to render it unconstitu-
tional, the court focused on whether it could even get to that issue, and
the court decided under Teague it was barred from doing so. However,
the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that these delays are a serious problem:
“Many agree with Petitioner that California’s capital punishment system
is dysfunctional and that the delay between sentencing and execution in
California is extraordinary.”194 But ultimately the court avoided the com-
plex issues and ramifications of affirming Judge Carney’s order invali-
dating capital punishment in California.
The court used Teague as a procedural bar to avoid the substantive
constitutional issues. While procedural issues are crucial and act as
thresholds that must be met prior to hearing a case on the merits, courts
usually have a substantial amount of discretion in how they deal with
those procedural issues and how they get to the merits. In Jones’ case
before the federal district court, Judge Carney put Jones’ unconstitutional
delay claim front and center when he heard the case. Out of the 30 claims
191 Although it is outside the scope of this Note to evaluate whether judicial bias exists in
capital punishment cases, and if it does exist, what role it plays, Michele Benedetto Neitz explores
the broader issue of bias in the judiciary and how it affects decisions on the bench. See Michele
Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary, 61 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 137 (2013) (“The
Article verifies the existence of implicit socioeconomic bias on the part of judges . . . [Fourth
Amendment and child custody cases] reveal that judges can and do favor wealthy litigants over those
living in poverty, with significant negative consequences for low-income people.”).
192 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 545 n.1 (9th Cir. 2015).
193 Id. at 544.
194 Id. at 553.
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alleged by the petitioner over the course of 454 pages in his first
amended petition, Judge Carney honed in on Jones’ unconstitutional de-
lay claim: “the extraordinarily lengthy delay in execution of sentence in
Mr. Jones’ case, coupled with the grave uncertainty of not knowing
whether his execution will ever be carried out, renders his death sentence
unconstitutional.”195
1. The court used judicial economy as a sword and a shield against
Jones
The Ninth Circuit used arguments related to judicial economy to
buttress its opinion.196 Judicial economy was used as a sword to turn the
table on Jones, effectively using his arguments against him to avoid deal-
ing with his substantive unconstitutional delay claim. Judicial economy
was also used as a shield to protect the court from wholeheartedly ad-
dressing Jones’ claim.
Jones’ own arguments were used against him by the court: “[T]he
very nature of Petitioner’s claim is that constitutional harm flows from
the delay inherent in judicial proceedings. If we know that we must deny
relief under Teague, we see nothing useful to be gained by imposing
more delay unnecessarily.”197 This is also what the court used to further
explain its reasoning for deciding the Teague issue.198 The court ex-
pressly stated that “judicial economy may outweigh constitutional-avoid-
ance concerns.”199 Effectively, the Ninth Circuit avoided the
constitutional issue by partially relying on arguments of judicial econ-
omy. However, “[r]equiring Mr. Jones to return to the California Su-
preme Court to exhaust his claim would only compound the delay that
has already plagued his post-conviction review process.”200
The Ninth Circuit used judicial economy to shield itself from decid-
ing the Eighth Amendment issue. It did so by improperly relying on
Teague and avoiding the current landscape of capital punishment
jurisprudence.
195 First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Prisoner in State Custody at 414,
Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (No. 09-02158-CJC), rev’d sub nom. Jones
v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
196 For the purposes of this Note, judicial economy refers to “[e]fficiency in the operation of
the courts and their judicial system; esp., the efficient management of litigation so as to minimize
duplication of effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary’s time and resources.” Judicial Economy,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
197 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 545 (9th Cir. 2015).
198 Id. at 544-45.
199 Id. at 545.
200 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1068 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v.
Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
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In Teague, the United States Supreme Court expressly noted it was
not stating how or whether retroactivity applied in death penalty
sentences,201 but the Ninth Circuit applied Teague in Jones’ death pen-
alty case. In fact, Teague has been criticized for making the law “hope-
lessly complex and unworkable.”202 Further, no new “watershed rule[ ]
of criminal procedure” has ever qualified for retroactivity under
Teague.203 Additionally, the Teague Court said collateral challenges to
capital cases create such delays in enforcement, which may result in
ongoing litigation where there is no end in sight for those sentenced to
death.204
The Ninth Circuit also avoided the current landscape of capital pun-
ishment jurisprudence by treating Teague as a procedural bar to deciding
Jones’ unconstitutional delay claim. In the 2014-2015 term of the United
States Supreme Court, the Court issued five opinions for death penalty
related cases,205 and seven in the 2015-2016 term,206 one of which had
an immediate impact on executions.207 Two death penalty related cases
were scheduled for argument during the October 2016 term.208 In recent
years, some of the justices have voiced concerns about the death penalty
both on and off the bench. Justices Kennedy and Stevens raised serious
questions in recent cases relating to the amount of time prisoners spend
on death row as it relates to the death penalty.209 Justices Scalia and
201
“Because petitioner is not under sentence of death, we need not, and do not, express any
views as to how the retroactivity approach we adopt today is to be applied in the capital sentencing
context.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314 n.2 (1989).
202 John H. Blume & William Pratt, Understanding Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 325, 326 (1991).
203 Lyle Denniston, Court Query of Teague Retroactivity, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 21, 2007,
10:40 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2007/03/court-query-on-teague-retroactivity/ (quoting
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311 (1989)).
204
“Collateral challenges to the sentence in a capital case . . . delay the enforcement of the
judgment at issue and decrease the possibility that ‘there will at some point be the certainty that
comes with an end to litigation.’” Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n.2 (quoting Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 25 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
205 United States Supreme Court Decisions: 2015-2015 Term, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-states-supreme-court-decisions-2015-2016-term (last up-
dated July 1, 2016).
206 United States Supreme Court Decisions: 2014-2015 Term, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/united-states-supreme-court-decisions-2014-2015-term (last up-
dated Dec. 17, 2015).
207 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015).
208 Buck v. Davis, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/buck-v-ste-
phens/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2016); Moore v. Texas, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/
case-files/cases/moore-v-texas/ (last visited Nov. 13, 2016).
209 Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 543 (2009) (mem.) (“[T]he penological justifications
for the death penalty diminish as the delay lengthens. Thus, I find constitutionally significant . . . the
nature of the penalty itself.” (citations omitted)). Justice Kennedy’s Questions About the Death Pen-
alty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/statements-death-penalty-su-
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Brennan spoke publicly about the death penalty: Justice Scalia said the
death penalty will likely be overturned soon210 and Justice Brennan said
executions are often arbitrary.211
2. The court’s proposed remedy for Jones is deeply problematic
In California, the capital punishment system continues to fail not
only death row inmates, their family and friends, but also the family and
friends of the victims as they await justice. The Ninth Circuit stated that
“[Jones] remains free to seek relief through other means, including the
state courts.”212 However, there are two problems with this suggestion.
First, the court used arguments related to judicial economy to explain
why and how they came to decide this case and reverse the federal dis-
trict court’s decision. In suggesting that Jones return to the state courts,
the Ninth Circuit undermines its own arguments of judicial economy. In
effect, the court suggests that Jones must start the process all over again,
which contravenes any idea or understanding of judicial economy. Sec-
ond, the implication is that Jones has another alternative regarding his
unconstitutional delay claim: give up. This implication is deeply prob-
lematic because it suggests that Jones cannot ever prevail and thus dis-
courages his pursuit of future legal claims. The court itself states that the
post-conviction review process is in place to secure the rights of inmates
on death row potentially facing execution.213 However, the sentence of
death “is in a class by itself” and must be treated accordingly.214 Anyone,
let alone the courts, should understand that those facing the ultimate sen-
tence may use every means available to fight for their lives. Ironically,
preme-court-justices#Kennedy (last visited Nov. 13, 2016). In Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986
(2014), Justice Kennedy asked whether the average wait time for execution of a death row inmate in
Florida, 24.9 years, “is consistent with . . . the purposes that the death penalty is designed to serve,
and is it consistent with an orderly administration of justice?” And in Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct.
2187 (2015), Justice Kennedy again focused on the length of time, and noted out that death row
inmate Ayala committed the crime approximately 30 years prior and his trial was in 1996.
210 Jennifer Pignolet, Pope’s Death Penalty Remarks Draw Renewed Attention to Scalia’s
Memphis Speech, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.commercialappeal.com/
news/national/popes-death-penalty-remarks-draw-renewed-attention-to-scalias-memphis-speech—
2088701b-fa02-3683-e05-329371591.html (“If we decide—and it wouldn’t surprise me if we de-
cided the death penalty is unconstitutional—that will be the end of it.”).
211 Ari Melber, Justice Stephen Breyer: Executions Are Often ‘Arbitrary’, MSNBC, http://
www.msnbc.com/msnbc/justice-stephen-breyer-executions-are-often-arbitrary (last updated Oct. 6,
2015 6:34 PM) (“Often it’s very arbitrary as to who gets executed. . ..”).
212 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 546 n.2 (9th Cir. 2015).
213 Id. at 551 (quoting Chambers v. Bowersox, 157 F.3d 560, 570 (8th Cir. 1998)).
214
“The unusual severity of death is manifested most clearly in its finality and enormity.
Death, in these respects, is in a class by itself.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 288 (1972)
(Brennan, J. concurring).
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the one available avenue that may be most effective is the very system
that sentenced them to death, rightly or wrongly, in the first place.
The Ninth Circuit relied on the argument that “such delays are the
product of a constitutional safeguard, not a constitutional defect, because
they assure careful review of the defendant’s conviction and sen-
tence.”215 The court noted that the systematic delays may not be arbi-
trary, as argued by Jones.216 Again, the court ignored the legitimacy of a
constitutional attack on the state’s death penalty system with an argu-
ment about the constitutional protections afforded to prisoners. Effec-
tively, the court is saying “Don’t complain about the process, be glad that
you have one at all.”
III. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit should have affirmed Judge Carney’s order vacat-
ing Jones’ death sentence and declaring California’s capital punishment
system unconstitutional. Instead, the court implemented and analyzed the
Teague doctrine to avoid the critical issue of the constitutionality of Cali-
fornia’s death penalty. The court used arguments of judicial economy
and protecting the rights of death row inmates to support their decision.
By doing so, the court suggested Jones “seek relief through other
means,”217 a suggestion that is deeply problematic because it contravenes
any appropriate understanding of judicial economy and implies Jones
should give up his fight against being executed. The suggestion is also
problematic because it ignores the legitimacy of a constitutional chal-
lenge to the State’s capital punishment system. Instead, the court reminds
Jones that the delays act as a safeguard,218 effectively suggesting that the
delays work to benefit him and other inmates awaiting execution in
California.
The death penalty is a critical issue, especially in California. Like
people across the country, Californians are losing confidence in capital
punishment. The State houses more death row inmates than any other
state in the country and spends billions of dollars doing so,219 but has not
executed a prisoner since 2006.220 As each day passes, more death row
inmates die of natural causes while they, alongside victims’ families,
215 Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538, 551 (quoting People v. Seumanu, 355 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal.
2015) (citing People v. Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 390 (2001))) (9th Cir. 2015).
216 Id. at 552 (citing People v. Seumanu, 355 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2015)).
217 Id. at 546 n.2.
218 Id. at 551 (quoting People v. Seumanu, 355 P.3d 384, 442 (Cal. 2015) (citing People v.
Anderson, 22 P.3d 347, 390 (2001))).
219 Alarco´n & Mitchell, supra note 6.
220 Number of Executions, 1893 to Present, supra note 7.
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await the ultimate punishment promised by the State: execution. The leg-
islative process in California has not provided an answer, so Californians
and death row inmates must rely on the judicial process for relief.
Jones’ case exemplifies the problem for both supporters and protes-
tors of California’s capital punishment system. After Jones was sen-
tenced to death, Pam, the victim’s daughter, declared in the courtroom
that “the sentencing was a hollow act because executions are rarely car-
ried out at San Quentin.”221 This is the same argument Jones made
before the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Two decades later with Jones still sitting on death row, Pam’s fear has
become a reality: Jones’ death sentence has transformed into “life in
prison, with the remote possibility of death.”222
221 Feldman, Murderer is Sentenced to Death, supra note 9.
222 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v.
Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015).
26
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 47, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol47/iss1/8
